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Abstract—The foundations of cognition and cognitive be-
haviour are consistently proposed to be built upon the capability
to predict (at various levels of abstraction). For autonomous
cognitive agents, this implicitly assumes a foundational role for
memory, as a mechanism by which prior experience can be
brought to bear in the service of present and future behaviour.
In this contribution, this idea is extended to propose that an
active process of memory provides the substrate for cognitive
processing, particularly when considering it as fundamentally
associative and from a developmental perspective. It is in this
context that the claim is made that in order to solve the question
of cognition, the role and function of memory must be fully
resolved.
I. PREDICTION, COGNITION, AND MEMORY
There are a range of competencies that are involved in cog-
nition: an ongoing challenge is to identify common functional
and organisational principles of operation. This will facilitate
both the understanding of natural cognition (particularly that
of humans), and the creation of synthetic artefacts that can
be of use to individuals and society. One such principle is
that of prediction [1], prospection [2], or indeed simulation
[3], as being fundamental to cognition. A further requirement
is the need to incorporate an account of development [4] as a
means of an individual to gain cognitive competencies through
experience (of the physical and social world), rather than a
priori programming.
It is suggested that one common dependency of these princi-
ples is a requirement for memory. At this point, the definition
of memory provided is only in the broadest sense: i.e. memory
is a process that acquires information through experience in
the service of current and future behaviour [5]. While broad,
it nevertheless commits to a fundamental function/role for
memory in behaviour [6]. It is on this basis that the remainder
of this contribution is focused: taking memory as fundamental,
how can it be characterised such that it serves cognition (and
the development thereof)?
In one particular perspective grounded in neuropsycholog-
ical data, emphasis is placed on the associative and network
nature of memory. This is apparent in the “Network Memory”
framework for example [7], which proposes a hierarchical
and heterarchical organisation of overlapping distributed as-
sociative networks that that formed through experience, and
whose reactivation gives rise to the dynamics that instantiate
cognition [8]. Such a perspective is not unusual, e.g. [1],
despite the apparent contradiction to multi-system accounts
of memory organisation, e.g. [9], [10], with it being also
consistent with more purely theoretical considerations, e.g.
[11], that emphasise the dynamical process properties of
memory over passive information storage.
By taking on this interpretation of memory, a more re-
fined process definition memory may be ventured: memory
is a distributed associative structure that is created through
experience (the formation associations), and which forms the
substrate for activation dynamics (through externally driven
activity, and internal reactivation) that gives rise to cognitive
processing [12], [5]. The creation of structure through expe-
rience is consistent with developmental accounts, and enforce
the consideration of not only interaction with the environment,
but also the social context of the learning agent (if human-
like cognition is to be considered). Previous explorations have
suggested how this framework can be used (in principle)
to account for human-level cognitive competencies within a
memory-centred cognitive architecture [13], although there
remain many gaps in this account that require addressing
before it can be considered definitive.
II. APPLICATION AND IMPLICATIONS
Following this definition, take for example the role that
such a memory-centred cognitive architecture could play in
facilitating social robot behaviour, as a prototypical example
of a cognitive competence that needs to be fulfilled. It is
uncontroversial to suggest that humans incrementally acquire
social skills (though perhaps based on some inherently present
mechanisms) over time and through development. The role
of memory within this is therefore also not controversial,
particularly when skills such as intent prediction (based on
prior experience) are also considered [14]. Using an associative
network that learns from the behaviour of the interaction
partner [15], following the use of simple associative learning
in [16], it has been found that a degree of behavioural
alignment between a child and a robot is observed within
real-time interactions - an effect readily seen in human-human
interactions. While only a basic illustration of human-like
competence, this nevertheless demonstrates the importance of
memory for social HRI [17], and thus establishes associativity
as a candidate foundational mechanism for a social cognitive
architecture. Similarly, with associativity being considered
sufficient for generating predictions as noted above, and pre-
diction/anticipation being considered essential for sociality in
terms of supporting coordination [18], then such an account
of memory remains consistent.
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An alternative implementation using similar principles of
associativity and interactive learning has been applied to a
range of embodied and developmental psychology models
related to language. The Epigenetic Robotics Architecture
(ERA) [19] emphasises associative learning, and is instantiated
through linked self-organising maps (SOM), arranged through
a “hub” SOM that learns from body posture. This structure,
learning from a blank initial state, can provide an account
of how aspects of language can extend cognitive processing
[20], and of how word learning in infants is mediated by body
posture [21]. In each of these examples, the computational in-
stantiation of ERA is the same, but the functionality observed
differs based on the interaction context of the experiment.
Given the fundamentally associative nature of the learning
process, this is consistent with the memory-centred account of
social human-robot interaction competence described above.
In many principled but low-level approaches – including the
those systems based on the developmental systems paradigm,
as subscribed to here – there is often a gap between the theo-
retical consistency and the complexity of the applied resulting
system, with simplified (or rather constrained) problems typi-
cally targeted. While the memory-centred approach advocated
here suffers similarly, the range of applications outlined in
the previous paragraphs cover a number of aspects of “higher
level” (indeed, human-level) cognition that go beyond the
typical domains for low-level associative systems. The efforts
described here remain relatively sparse and currently lack a
computational integration into a single coherent system that
existing psychologically-derived cognitive architectures (such
as SOAR, ACT-R, etc) attempt. Nevertheless, there appears to
be a convergence of principles of operation that the present
work seeks to extend: cognition founded on formation and
manipulation of memory, and memory as associative and
developmental. At the least, what is proposed here is a re-
framing of the problem: not to look at cognition from the
perspective of the ‘computation’ or the behavioural outcome
as is typical, but rather to re-evaluate the problem from the
perspective of memory.
III. THE SUFFICIENCY OF AN ACCOUNT OF MEMORY
The outcome of this discussion is a commitment to a
fundamentally associative structure of memory, with this main-
taining consistency with the developmental perspective, and
as illustrated through the social human-robot interaction and
language examples. The outline described in this abstract
points to a framework within which the relationship between
memory and cognition can be understood, although there
remain a number of open questions that need to be resolved,
such as reconciliation with empirical evidence supporting the
multi-systems organisation of memory, e.g. [10], and the in-
terplay of memory with non-memory mechanisms underlying
cognition (such as affective processes, e.g. [22]). Nevertheless,
the proposal is that even these aspects could be approached
from the perspective of memory. In all, this leads to the view
that in order to ‘solve’ cognition, the problem of memory
must be fully resolved. Indeed, the suggestion of the present
contribution goes beyond this: that a full account of memory
may be sufficient to provide an account of cognition.
REFERENCES
[1] M. Bar, “The proactive brain: using analogies and associations to
generate predictions,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 11, no. 7,
pp. 280–289, 2007.
[2] D. Vernon, M. Beetz, and G. Sandini, “Prospection in Cognition: The
Case for Joint Episodic-Procedural Memory in Cognitive Robotics,”
Frontiers in Robotics and AI, vol. 2, no. July, pp. 1–14, 2015.
[3] G. Hesslow, “Conscious thought as simulation of behaviour and percep-
tion,” Trends in cognitive sciences, vol. 6, no. 6, pp. 242–247, 2002.
[4] J. Weng, J. McClelland, A. Pentland, O. Sporns, I. Stockman, M. Sur,
and E. Thelen, “Autonomous Mental Development by Robots and
Animals,” Science, vol. 291, pp. 599–600, 2001.
[5] R. Wood, P. Baxter, and T. Belpaeme, “A Review of long-term memory
in natural and synthetic systems,” Adaptive Behavior, vol. 20, no. 2,
pp. 81–103, 2012.
[6] A. M. Glenberg, “What Memory is For,” The Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 1–19; discussion 19–55, 1997.
[7] J. M. Fuster, “Network Memory,” Trends in Neurosciences, vol. 20,
no. 10, pp. 451–9, 1997.
[8] J. M. Fuster and S. L. Bressler, “Past Makes Future: Role of pFC in
Prediction,” Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 639–
654, 2015.
[9] L. R. Squire, “Memory systems of the brain: a brief history and current
perspective.,” Neurobiology of learning and memory, vol. 82, no. 3,
pp. 171–7, 2004.
[10] G. Repovs and A. Baddeley, “The multi-component model of working
memory: explorations in experimental cognitive psychology,” Neuro-
science, vol. 139, no. 1, pp. 5–21, 2006.
[11] A. Riegler, “Constructive memory,” Kybernetes, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 89–
104, 2005.
[12] P. Baxter and W. Browne, “Memory as the substrate of cognition: a
developmental cognitive robotics perspective,” in Proceedings of the
Tenth International Conference on Epigenetic Robotics (B. Johansson,
E. Sahin, and C. Balkenius, eds.), (O¨rena¨s Slott, Sweden), pp. 19–26,
2010.
[13] P. Baxter, R. Wood, A. Morse, and T. Belpaeme, “Memory-Centred
Architectures: Perspectives on Human-level Cognitive Competencies,” in
Proceedings of the AAAI Fall 2011 symposium on Advances in Cognitive
Systems (P. Langley, ed.), (Arlington, Virginia, U.S.A.), pp. 26–33,
AAAI Press, 2011.
[14] Y. Demiris, “Prediction of intent in robotics and multi-agent systems,”
Cognitive Processing, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 151–8, 2007.
[15] P. E. Baxter, J. de Greeff, and T. Belpaeme, “Cognitive architecture for
humanrobot interaction: Towards behavioural alignment,” Biologically
Inspired Cognitive Architectures, vol. 6, pp. 30–39, 2013.
[16] K. Dautenhahn and A. Billard, “Studying robot social cognition within a
developmental psychology framework,” in Third European Workshop on
Advanced Mobile Robots (Eurobot’99), (Zurich, Switzerland), pp. 187–
194, 1999.
[17] P. Baxter, “Memory-Centred Cognitive Architectures for Robots Inter-
acting Socially with Humans,” in 2nd Workshop on Cognitive Archi-
tectures for Social Human-Robot Interaction at HRI’16, (Christchurch,
New Zealand), 2016.
[18] E. Di Paolo and H. De Jaegher, “The interactive brain hypothesis,”
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, vol. 6, pp. 1–16, 2012.
[19] A. F. Morse, J. De Greeff, T. Belpaeme, and A. Cangelosi, “Epige-
netic Robotics Architecture (ERA),” IEEE Transactions on Autonomous
Mental Development, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 325–339, 2010.
[20] A. F. Morse, P. Baxter, T. Belpaeme, L. B. Smith, and A. Cangelosi,
“The Power of Words,” in Joint IEEE International Conference on
Development and Learning and on Epigenetic Robotics, (Frankfurt am
Main, Germany), pp. 1–6, IEEE Press, 2011.
[21] A. F. Morse, V. L. Benitez, T. Belpaeme, A. Cangelosi, and L. B. Smith,
“Posture affects how robots and infants map words to objects,” PLoS
ONE, vol. 10, no. 3, 2015.
[22] A. R. Damasio, “The somatic marker hypothesis and the possible
functions of the prefrontal cortex,” Philosophical Transactions Of the
Royal Society B, vol. 351, pp. 1413–1420, 1996.
Proceedings of EUCognition 2016 - "Cognitive Robot Architectures" - CEUR-WS 59
